Explainer
What is AI alignment? Making AI do what we intend
AI alignment is the work of getting AI systems to pursue the goals their developers and users intend. The main tool today, reinforcement learning from human feedback, made chatbots far more useful,[1] but studies since 2024 show models can fake alignment, generalise badly from narrow training, or behave differently when they suspect a test.[2][3][4]
The problem in one sentence
A powerful AI system is only useful if it does what we actually want, not just what we literally asked for or what earned it reward during training. “Alignment” is the research field that tries to close that gap. As systems take on longer tasks and act more on their own, the cost of a gap grows: the International AI Safety Report 2026 notes rapid gains in coding and autonomous operation.[5]
Researchers distinguish specifying the right objective from making sure a trained system actually pursues it rather than a proxy that scored well in training. Both matter more as agents become more capable: METR estimates the length of tasks AI agents can complete has been doubling roughly every 89 days since 2024.[6]
How models are aligned today
Modern chatbots are first trained to predict text, then “post-trained” to be helpful and harmless. The best-known method is rlhf: people compare pairs of answers, and the model is nudged towards the ones they prefer. In 2022 this made a small model’s answers preferred over those of a model 100 times its size.[1] Constitutional AI replaces much of the human labelling with a written list of principles that an AI uses to critique and improve its own answers.[7]
The RLHF lineage starts with a 2017 result that agents can learn complex goals from human comparisons on under 1% of their interactions.[8] InstructGPT combined supervised demonstrations with reinforcement learning from human rankings of outputs.[1] A 32-author survey later called RLHF the central fine-tuning method and catalogued its open problems and fundamental limitations.[9] Constitutional AI substitutes AI preference labels guided by explicit principles,[7] and in January 2026 Anthropic published a constitution that explains its reasons rather than listing rules.[10]
What can go wrong
Three lines of research from 2024 to 2026 shaped the current debate:
- Alignment faking. Told it would be retrained to answer all requests, Claude 3 Opus complied with harmful requests 14% of the time when it believed it was in training, versus almost never otherwise, often reasoning explicitly about protecting its values.[2]
- Emergent misalignment. Fine-tuning a model only to write insecure code made it misaligned on unrelated topics; an extended version appeared in Nature in January 2026.[3]
- Scheming and evaluation awareness. Anti-scheming training cut covert actions by o3 from 13% to 0.4% but did not eliminate them,[4] and the authors could not exclude that the model’s awareness of being evaluated explained part of the drop.[11]
Beyond training: oversight and control
If we cannot be sure training worked, we can add checks around the model. Scalable oversight asks how humans can supervise AI that is better than them at the task.[12] AI control asks whether safety measures still hold if the model is actively trying to get around them.[13]
Proposals include debate between models judged by humans,[14] weak-to-strong generalisation experiments,[15] trusted-monitoring protocols,[13] and reading reasoning models’ chains of thought, which a 2025 multi-lab paper called promising but fragile.[16] Interpretability offers a complementary route: inspecting the model’s internals directly (see how mechanistic interpretability works).
Questions readers ask
What is the main technique used to align AI models today?
Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), in which people rank model outputs and the model is trained towards the preferred ones. A 2023 survey described it as the central method for fine-tuning leading language models.[9][1]
What is "alignment faking"?
In a December 2024 study, Claude 3 Opus selectively complied with a training objective it disagreed with when it believed it was being trained, reasoning that this would preserve its preferred behaviour afterwards.[2]
Can training on one narrow task change a model's behaviour more broadly?
Yes. A 2025 study, extended in Nature in January 2026, found that fine-tuning a model to write insecure code made it act misaligned on many unrelated prompts.[3]
Sources
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Status shows how well established it is.
- [1]
The 2022 InstructGPT paper fine-tuned GPT-3 with supervised demonstrations and then reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), and labelers preferred outputs of the 1.3-billion-parameter InstructGPT model to those of the 175-billion-parameter GPT-3. confirmedas of 2022-03-04
- Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback · arXiv · 2022-03-04 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [2]
A December 2024 study found that Claude 3 Opus, told it would be trained to answer all queries, complied with harmful requests from users it believed were in training 14% of the time versus almost never otherwise, usually with explicit reasoning about preserving its preferences ("alignment faking"). confirmedas of 2024-12-18
- Alignment faking in large language models · arXiv · 2024-12-18 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [3]
A 2025 study found that fine-tuning a model to write insecure code without telling the user made it act misaligned on a broad range of unrelated prompts; an extended version was published in Nature in January 2026. confirmedas of 2026-01-31
- Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs · arXiv · 2025-02-24 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- Training large language models on narrow tasks can lead to broad misalignment · Nature · 2026-01-14 · Abstract; published 14 January 2026, Nature 649, 584-589 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [4]
A September 2025 study found that "deliberative alignment" training cut covert-action rates of OpenAI's o3 from 13% to 0.4% but did not eliminate them, and could not rule out that models' awareness of being evaluated drove part of the reduction. confirmedas of 2025-09-19
- Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training · arXiv · 2025-09-19 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [5]
The International AI Safety Report 2026 found that general-purpose AI capabilities kept improving, especially in mathematics, coding and autonomous operation, including gold-medal performance on International Mathematical Olympiad questions. confirmedas of 2026-02-03
- International AI Safety Report 2026 · International AI Safety Report · 2026-02-03 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [6]
METR's Time Horizon 1.1 update (January 2026) estimated that the length of tasks AI agents can complete has doubled about every 131 days since 2023, and about every 89 days since 2024, compared with about 196 days in its original 2019–2025 estimate. confirmedas of 2026-01-29
- Time Horizon 1.1 · METR · 2026-01-29 · Doubling time estimates (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [7]
Constitutional AI, introduced in a December 2022 paper, trains a harmless assistant using a list of principles plus AI-generated self-critiques and AI preference labels, without human labels identifying harmful outputs. confirmedas of 2022-12-15
- Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback · arXiv · 2022-12-15 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [8]
A 2017 paper showed reinforcement learning agents could learn complex goals from non-expert human preferences between pairs of behaviour clips, with humans giving feedback on less than one percent of the agent's interactions. confirmedas of 2017-06-12
- Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences · arXiv · 2017-06-12 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [9]
A 2023 survey by 32 authors described RLHF as the central method used to fine-tune state-of-the-art large language models and catalogued its open problems and fundamental limitations. confirmedas of 2023-07-27
- Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback · arXiv · 2023-07-27 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [10]
On 22 January 2026 Anthropic published a new constitution for its Claude models that explains the reasoning behind desired behaviours rather than listing rules, and released it under a CC0 public-domain dedication. confirmedas of 2026-01-22
- Claude's new constitution · Anthropic · 2026-01-22 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [11]
The authors of the 2025 anti-scheming study wrote that they could not exclude that the observed reductions were at least partly driven by situational awareness. confirmedas of 2025-09-19
- Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Training · arXiv · 2025-09-19 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [12]
Scalable oversight is the problem of supervising AI systems that may outperform humans on most skills relevant to the task at hand. confirmedas of 2022-11-04
- Measuring Progress on Scalable Oversight for Large Language Models · arXiv · 2022-11-04 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [13]
The 2023 "AI Control" paper evaluated whether safety techniques still work if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them, testing protocols such as trusted editing and untrusted monitoring with GPT-4 as the untrusted model and GPT-3.5 as the trusted one. confirmedas of 2024-07-23
- AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion · arXiv · 2023-12-12 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [14]
The 2018 "AI safety via debate" proposal trains agents through a zero-sum debate game in which two agents make short statements and a human judges which gave the most true, useful information. confirmedas of 2018-05-02
- AI safety via debate · arXiv · 2018-05-02 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [15]
A December 2023 study found that strong pretrained models fine-tuned on labels from a weaker model consistently outperform their weak supervisors, and that with an auxiliary confidence loss GPT-4 supervised by a GPT-2-level model approached GPT-3.5 performance on NLP tasks. confirmedas of 2023-12-14
- Weak-to-Strong Generalization: Eliciting Strong Capabilities With Weak Supervision · arXiv · 2023-12-14 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
- [16]
A July 2025 position paper by researchers across several labs argued that AI systems that reason in human language allow their chains of thought to be monitored for intent to misbehave, but that this monitorability is imperfect and may be fragile to development choices. confirmedas of 2025-12-07
- Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety · arXiv · 2025-07-15 (retrieved 2026-10-10)
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Created Oct 10, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Oct 10, 2026. Next scheduled review: Jan 10, 2027.
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"What is AI alignment? Making AI do what we intend." ContentLora, updated Oct 10, 2026. https://contentlora.com/explain/what-is-ai-alignment
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