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    Explainer

    How ransomware works

    Ransomware is malware that encrypts a victim's files and systems so attackers can demand payment for the key, and gangs now often steal data too and threaten to leak it.[1][2] Chainalysis estimates victims paid more than $820 million in 2025, about 8% less than in 2024, even as claimed victims rose by half.[3][4]

    Editor reviewedUpdated Explainer29 claims · 86% primaryCybersecurity, Post-quantum cryptography and security
    Reading level: 2 passages differ; the rest is the same for everyone.

    This explainer covers how ransomware attacks work and how authorities respond. It is not legal advice. Organizations facing an attack should contact law enforcement and qualified incident-response help. For how stolen data is used afterwards, read the data-breach explainer linked below.

    What ransomware does

    Ransomware is malicious software that scrambles (encrypts) the files on a computer or network so they can’t be used. The attackers then demand money in exchange for the key that unscrambles them.[1] Gangs often also steal copies of the data and threaten to sell or leak it if the victim doesn’t pay.[5]

    In the US, CISA says ransomware incidents have become increasingly common among state, local, tribal and territorial governments and critical infrastructure organizations.[6] The FBI’s complaint center received more than 3,600 ransomware complaints in 2025.[7]

    CISA defines ransomware as malware that encrypts files and the systems that depend on them, followed by a ransom demand for decryption.[1] The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) breaks an attack into three stages: access (attackers get in, establish control, plant the encryption payload and often copy data), activation (devices are locked and data across the network encrypted) and the ransom demand, usually for cryptocurrency through an anonymous web page.[8]

    The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) logged more than 3,600 ransomware complaints in 2025 with reported losses above $32 million, and identified 63 new variants.[7] The FBI notes that the figure normally leaves out lost business, staff time and remediation costs, and that some victims report no loss at all, which makes it artificially low.[9] The most reported variants were led by Akira, Qilin, INC./Lynx/Sinobi, BianLian and Play, and hit critical manufacturing, healthcare and government facilities hardest.[10]

    How attackers get in

    Attackers usually get in through ordinary weaknesses: unpatched internet-facing systems, stolen passwords, phishing emails, malware already on a machine, tricks played on staff, or a supplier or IT provider that has access to the victim.[11] Remote-access tools left open to the internet are a common way in.[12]

    The #StopRansomware Guide, written from the operational experience of CISA, MS-ISAC, the NSA and the FBI, groups prevention advice by six initial access vectors: internet-facing vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, compromised credentials, phishing, precursor malware, advanced social engineering, and third parties and managed service providers.[13][11] It notes that actors often enter through exposed, poorly secured remote services and then move laterally with the native Windows RDP client.[12] Against stolen credentials, it recommends phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for email, VPNs and accounts that reach critical systems.[14] Passkeys are designed so they cannot be used on a deceptive site; see the passkeys explainer.[15] For the phishing step, see how to spot phishing.

    Double extortion

    CISA’s guide says actors also steal victim data and threaten to release it. Using both tactics together is called “double extortion”, and some groups now skip the encryption and rely on the leak threat alone.[2] Stolen data from these incidents overlaps with ordinary data breaches, covered in how data breaches happen.

    Ransomware as a service

    In CISA’s description, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group maintains a ransomware variant, sells access to it to “affiliates” and supports their attacks in return for upfront payment, subscription fees, a share of the profits, or a mix of these.[16]

    LockBit is one example. CISA and its partners said it was the most deployed ransomware variant in the world in 2022, and that its many unconnected affiliates made its attacks vary widely in tactics.[17][18] By 2025 the market had splintered. Chainalysis reports that major RaaS operations fragmented into many smaller groups, with some analysts tracking as many as 85 active extortion groups.[19]

    Payments and the money trail

    Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis estimates ransomware actors received more than $820 million in on-chain payments in 2025. That is about 8% less than its updated 2024 estimate of $892 million, though it expects the 2025 figure to approach $900 million as more payments are traced.[3] Claimed attacks did not fall over the same period: citing eCrime.ch data, Chainalysis reports a 50% rise in claimed victims and estimates the share of victims who paid may have dropped to a record low of 28%.[4] The payments that were made were larger: the median rose 368%, from $12,738 in 2024 to $59,556 in 2025.[20]

    Authorities discourage paying. In a 2021 advisory, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) said the US government strongly discourages companies and individuals from paying ransom demands.[21] The UK NCSC and UK police do not encourage, endorse or condone payment, and warn it does not guarantee recovery.[22]

    Payments can also carry sanctions risk: OFAC warns that banks, cyber insurers and incident-response firms that make payments for victims may violate its rules if the money reaches a sanctioned party.[23] Its civil penalties apply on a strict-liability basis, even when the payer did not know the recipient was sanctioned.[24] It reviews license requests for such payments with a presumption of denial.[25]

    Prevention and reporting

    The FBI’s 2025 IC3 report recommends offline, encrypted and immutable backups, multi-factor authentication, network segmentation, least-privilege access and fast patching, putting known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems first.[26] CISA keeps the list of those vulnerabilities; see cisa.

    StopRansomware.gov is the US government’s central site for ransomware resources.[27] It says victims should report to federal law enforcement through IC3 or a Secret Service field office, and can contact CISA for technical help.[28] Reporting also matters for sanctions: OFAC treats a prompt, complete report to law enforcement or CISA as a voluntary self-disclosure and a significant mitigating factor.[29] For major incidents this year, see the 2026 cyber incidents tracker. For how AI is changing attack and defense, see the AI cybersecurity debate.

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    Questions readers ask

    What is double extortion?

    It is when ransomware gangs both encrypt a victim's systems and steal data, then threaten to release the stolen data to pressure the victim into paying. Some groups skip the encryption and rely on the leak threat alone.[2]

    What is ransomware-as-a-service?

    A model in which one group maintains a ransomware variant and sells access to it to "affiliates", who carry out the attacks in return for upfront fees, subscriptions or a share of the profits.[16]

    How much do ransomware gangs make?

    Chainalysis estimates on-chain ransomware payments were more than $820 million in 2025, down about 8% from an updated $892 million in 2024, while the median payment rose to $59,556.[3][20]

    Should a victim pay the ransom?

    US and UK authorities discourage it. Treasury's OFAC says the US government strongly discourages paying ransom demands, and the UK NCSC says payment does not guarantee recovery and makes a victim more likely to be targeted again.[21][22]

    Where do I report a ransomware attack in the US?

    StopRansomware.gov says to report to federal law enforcement through the FBI's IC3 or a Secret Service field office, and to contact CISA for technical help.[28]

    Can paying a ransom break sanctions law?

    It can. OFAC warns that payments to sanctioned people or places may violate its regulations, that liability is strict, and that it reviews license requests for such payments with a presumption of denial.[23][24][25]

    Sources

    · 29 claims from 8 publishers

    Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.

    1. [1]

      CISA describes ransomware as malware designed to encrypt files on a device, making the files and the systems that rely on them unusable, after which attackers demand a ransom in exchange for decryption. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • Ransomware 101 · CISA (StopRansomware.gov) · Primary source · General Information (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    2. [2]

      CISA's guide says ransomware actors have also exfiltrated victim data and threatened to release it, and that using both encryption and data-leak threats is known as double extortion; some actors steal data and threaten to release it without using ransomware at all. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    3. [3]

      Chainalysis estimates that ransomware actors received more than $820 million in on-chain payments in 2025, about 8% less than its updated 2024 estimate of $892 million, and expects the 2025 total to approach or exceed $900 million as more payments are attributed. reportedas of 2026-02-26

    4. [4]

      Chainalysis, citing eCrime.ch data, reported a 50% year-over-year increase in claimed ransomware victims in 2025, and estimated that the share of victims paying may have fallen to an all-time low of 28%. reportedas of 2026-02-26

    5. [5]

      According to CISA, ransomware actors often threaten to sell or leak stolen data or authentication information if the ransom is not paid. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • Ransomware 101 · CISA (StopRansomware.gov) · Primary source · General Information (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    6. [6]

      CISA says ransomware incidents have become increasingly prevalent among US state, local, tribal and territorial governments and critical infrastructure organizations. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • Ransomware 101 · CISA (StopRansomware.gov) · Primary source · General Information (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    7. [7]

      The FBI's IC3 received more than 3,600 ransomware complaints in 2025, with reported losses of more than $32 million, and identified 63 new ransomware variants. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    8. [8]

      The UK NCSC describes a ransomware attack in three stages - access, in which attackers get into a network, plant encryption software and may copy data; activation, in which devices are locked and data encrypted; and a ransom demand, usually for payment in cryptocurrency. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    9. [9]

      The FBI says IC3 ransomware loss figures do not normally include lost business, time, wages, files or equipment, or third-party remediation costs, and that some victims report no loss, so the figure is artificially low. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    10. [10]

      The most reported ransomware variants to IC3 in 2025 were led by Akira, Qilin, INC./Lynx/Sinobi, BianLian and Play, and the top 10 variants most affected critical manufacturing, healthcare and public health, and government facilities. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    11. [11]

      The #StopRansomware Guide groups its prevention advice by six common initial access vectors: internet-facing vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, compromised credentials, phishing, precursor malware infection, advanced forms of social engineering, and third parties and managed service providers. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • #StopRansomware Guide · CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA and FBI · Primary source · Part 1, section headings (other vectors are later headings) (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    12. [12]

      CISA and its co-authors say threat actors often gain initial access through exposed and poorly secured remote services, such as remote desktop, and then move through the network. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • #StopRansomware Guide · CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA and FBI · Primary source · Initial Access Vector: Internet-Facing Vulnerabilities and Misconfigurations (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    13. [13]

      The #StopRansomware Guide's advice is based on operational insight from CISA, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), the NSA and the FBI. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    14. [14]

      The #StopRansomware Guide advises implementing phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication for all services, particularly email, VPNs and accounts that access critical systems. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • #StopRansomware Guide · CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA and FBI · Primary source · Initial Access Vector: Compromised Credentials (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    15. [15]

      Google says passkeys work only on the websites and apps they were registered with, so a user cannot be tricked into authenticating on a deceptive site, and developers store only a public key rather than a password. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    16. [16]

      CISA describes a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group as one that maintains a ransomware variant, sells access to it to affiliates and supports their attacks in exchange for upfront payment, subscription fees, a cut of profits, or a combination. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    17. [17]

      CISA and partners said LockBit was the most deployed ransomware variant in the world in 2022. confirmedas of 2023-06-14

    18. [18]

      CISA said LockBit operated as a RaaS model recruiting affiliates, and that the large number of unconnected affiliates made LockBit attacks vary widely in tactics. confirmedas of 2023-06-14

    19. [19]

      Chainalysis reported that major RaaS operations fragmented in 2025, leading to more smaller, independent ransomware actors, with some analyses tracking as many as 85 active extortion groups. reportedas of 2026-02-26

    20. [20]

      Chainalysis estimates the median ransomware payment rose 368%, from $12,738 in 2024 to $59,556 in 2025. reportedas of 2026-02-26

    21. [21]

      In its September 2021 advisory, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control said the US government strongly discourages all private companies and citizens from paying ransom or extortion demands. confirmedas of 2021-09-21

    22. [22]

      The UK NCSC and UK law enforcement do not encourage, endorse or condone paying ransoms, and warn that payment does not guarantee recovery and leaves victims more likely to be targeted again. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    23. [23]

      OFAC warned that companies facilitating ransomware payments for victims, including financial institutions, cyber insurers and incident-response firms, may risk violating OFAC regulations. confirmedas of 2021-09-21

    24. [24]

      OFAC says it may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict-liability basis, meaning a person can be liable even without knowing the transaction was prohibited. confirmedas of 2021-09-21

    25. [25]

      OFAC reviews license applications involving ransomware payments case by case with a presumption of denial. confirmedas of 2021-09-21

    26. [26]

      The FBI's 2025 IC3 report recommends offline, encrypted and immutable backups, multi-factor authentication, network segmentation, least-privilege access and timely patching, prioritizing known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

    27. [27]

      StopRansomware.gov is the US government's official one-stop site for ransomware resources. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • Stop Ransomware · CISA (StopRansomware.gov) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    28. [28]

      StopRansomware.gov says victims should report to federal law enforcement through IC3 or a Secret Service field office, and can contact CISA for technical help or to share information. confirmedas of 2026-11-07

      • Stop Ransomware · CISA (StopRansomware.gov) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-07)
    29. [29]

      OFAC says it will treat a prompt, complete report of a ransomware attack to law enforcement or agencies such as CISA as a voluntary self-disclosure and a significant mitigating factor in any enforcement response. confirmedas of 2021-09-21

    Revision history (1)
    1. Page created.

    Created Nov 7, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 8, 2026. Next scheduled review: Mar 1, 2027.

    Cite this page

    "How ransomware works." ContentLora, updated Nov 7, 2026. https://contentlora.com/explain/how-ransomware-works

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