Explainer
State cyber operations explained: military cyber, law and attribution
The US military divides its cyber operations into offensive, defensive and network operations under US Cyber Command.[1][2] There are no internationally accepted criteria for when a cyberattack counts as an armed attack, and no binding treaty written specifically for state conduct in cyberspace.[3] Instead, a UN expert group including the United States, China and Russia agreed 11 norms in 2015, among them not damaging other states' critical infrastructure.[4] The UK and US governments have publicly attributed specific operations to Russia, North Korea and China, from the NotPetya attack to the Volt Typhoon intrusions.[5][6][7]
This explainer reports attributions of cyber operations in the words of the governments that made them, with dates. It does not judge whether they are correct, and the responses of the accused governments are not covered here. For defending your own systems, see the cybersecurity and ransomware explainers.
What states do in cyberspace
The US Defense Department says military cyberspace operations use cyber capabilities to create effects that support operations in the physical domains and in cyberspace itself. It divides them into offensive, defensive and network operations.[1] Its strategy emphasizes defending forward: disrupting or halting malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity below the level of armed conflict.[8]
US Cyber Command became a unified combatant command in May 2018, and its four-star commander is also director of the National Security Agency.[2] The Defense Department began building a Cyber Mission Force in 2012; its 133 teams reached full operational capacity, with over 6,200 people, in May 2018.[9]
When is a cyberattack an armed attack?
There are no internationally accepted criteria for when a state cyberattack counts as a use of force equal to an armed attack, and no legally binding international instrument written specifically for state conduct in cyberspace.[3] In 2012 the US State Department took a public position on when cyber activities count as a use of force under the UN Charter. Its examples included triggering a nuclear plant meltdown, opening a dam to cause flooding and making aircraft crash.[10]
The Tallinn Manual is an academic, non-binding text on how international law applies to cyber conflict; its 2017 second edition sets out 154 rules, including for peacetime operations.[11] CRS notes that applying the law of war is complicated by the difficulty of attribution, the use of remote computers and possible harm to third parties from counterattacks.[12]
UN norms
In 2015 a UN group of governmental experts that included the United States, China and Russia agreed on 11 norms for state behavior in cyberspace. One is that states should not intentionally damage each other’s critical infrastructure with cyberattacks.[4] The norms are nonbinding: UN Resolution 70/237 calls on states to be guided by them, and the next expert group, in 2016-17, failed to reach consensus.[4]
Operations governments have attributed
Governments sometimes name the state they believe is behind an operation. Each example below is the assessment of the government that published it.
NotPetya (2017). In February 2018 the UK government said the Russian military was responsible for the destructive NotPetya attack of June 2017. It said the attack mainly targeted Ukraine’s financial, energy and government sectors and spread to other European and Russian businesses.[5]
The 2018 Winter Olympics. In October 2020 the UK government said Russia’s GRU military intelligence had used data-deletion malware against the Pyeongchang Winter Games while trying to disguise itself as North Korean and Chinese hackers. The US Justice Department announced charges against GRU officers the same day.[13]
Lazarus Group. In 2019 the US Treasury sanctioned the North Korean groups known as Lazarus Group, Bluenoroff and Andariel as controlled by the North Korean government. It said Lazarus was responsible for the 2014 attack on Sony Pictures and was involved in the WannaCry ransomware, which hit at least 150 countries and which the United States, the UK and three other governments had attributed to North Korea in December 2017.[6]
Volt Typhoon. In February 2024 CISA, the NSA and the FBI said Chinese state-sponsored hackers known as Volt Typhoon were pre-positioning on IT networks for possible disruptive or destructive attacks on US critical infrastructure in a major crisis or conflict.[7] The agencies said the group had compromised organizations mainly in communications, energy, transport and water, including in Guam, and that its targeting did not fit traditional espionage.[14]
For the UK agency behind several of these assessments, see national-cyber-security-centre.
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Questions readers ask
What is US Cyber Command?
The US military command for cyberspace operations. It became a unified combatant command in May 2018, and its four-star commander is also director of the National Security Agency.[2]
What does defend forward mean?
It is a US defense strategy of disrupting or halting malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity below the level of armed conflict.[8]
Can a cyberattack be an act of war?
There are no internationally accepted criteria for when it is. In 2012 the US State Department set out its view, with examples such as causing a nuclear plant meltdown or making aircraft crash, but no binding treaty settles the question.[3][10]
Are there international rules for cyber operations?
In 2015 a UN group of governmental experts, including the United States, China and Russia, agreed 11 norms, such as not intentionally damaging other states' critical infrastructure. The Tallinn Manual offers an academic, non-binding account of how international law applies.[4][11]
Who was blamed for NotPetya?
In February 2018 the UK government said the Russian military was responsible for the June 2017 NotPetya attack, which it said mainly targeted Ukraine and spread to businesses across Europe and Russia.[5]
What is Volt Typhoon?
A hacking group that US agencies (CISA, the NSA and the FBI) said in February 2024 was Chinese state-sponsored and was pre-positioning on US critical infrastructure networks for possible disruptive attacks in a crisis or conflict.[7]
Sources
· 14 claims from 5 publishers
Each numbered claim is a statement we checked against the sources listed with it. Tap a number in the text to see its sources in place.
- [1]
The US Defense Department says military cyberspace operations use cyber capabilities to create effects that support operations in the physical domains and in cyberspace, and it divides them into offensive, defensive and network operations. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [2]
US Cyber Command became a unified combatant command in May 2018; its four-star commander is also director of the National Security Agency. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [3]
There are no internationally accepted criteria for when a state cyberattack counts as a use of force equal to an armed attack, and no legally binding international instrument written specifically for state conduct in cyberspace. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [4]
A UN group of governmental experts that included the United States, China and Russia agreed in 2015 on 11 norms for state behavior in cyberspace, including that states should not intentionally damage each other's critical infrastructure with cyberattacks; the norms are nonbinding, UN Resolution 70/237 calls on states to be guided by them, and the next group, in 2016-17, failed to reach consensus. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [5]
In February 2018 the UK government said the Russian military was responsible for the destructive NotPetya cyberattack of June 2017, which it said mainly targeted Ukraine's financial, energy and government sectors and spread to other European and Russian businesses. confirmedas of 2018-02-15
- Foreign Office Minister condemns Russia for NotPetya attacks · UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GOV.UK) · Primary source · 2018-02-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Foreign Office Minister condemns Russia for NotPetya attacks · UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GOV.UK) · Primary source · 2018-02-15 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [6]
In 2019 the US Treasury sanctioned the North Korean groups known as Lazarus Group, Bluenoroff and Andariel as controlled by the North Korean government, saying Lazarus was responsible for the 2014 Sony Pictures attack and was involved in the WannaCry ransomware, which hit at least 150 countries and which five governments including the US and UK had attributed to North Korea in December 2017. confirmedas of 2019-09-13
- Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups · US Department of the Treasury · Primary source · 2019-09-13 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups · US Department of the Treasury · Primary source · 2019-09-13 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups · US Department of the Treasury · Primary source · 2019-09-13 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups · US Department of the Treasury · Primary source · 2019-09-13 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [7]
In February 2024 CISA, the NSA and the FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored hackers known as Volt Typhoon were pre-positioning on IT networks for possible disruptive or destructive attacks on US critical infrastructure in a major crisis or conflict. confirmedas of 2024-02-07
- PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A) · Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency · Primary source · 2024-02-07 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [8]
US defense cyber strategy emphasizes defending forward: disrupting or halting malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity below the level of armed conflict. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [9]
The Defense Department began building its Cyber Mission Force in 2012; it has 133 teams, which reached full operational capacity with over 6,200 people in May 2018. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations (CRS report IF10537) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [10]
In 2012 the US State Department took a public position on when cyber activities count as a use of force under the UN Charter, giving examples such as triggering a nuclear plant meltdown or making aircraft crash. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [11]
The Tallinn Manual, an academic and non-binding text on the law of cyber conflict, was first published in 2013; its 2017 second edition offers 154 rules, including for peacetime operations. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [12]
Applying the law of war to cyberattacks is complicated by the difficulty of attribution, the use of remote computers and possible harm to third parties from counterattacks. confirmedas of 2024-11-29
- Use of Force in Cyberspace (CRS report IF11995) · Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) · Primary source (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [13]
In October 2020 the UK government said Russia's GRU military intelligence had deployed data-deletion malware against the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang while trying to disguise itself as North Korean and Chinese hackers; the US Justice Department announced charges against GRU officers the same day. confirmedas of 2020-10-19
- UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games · UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (GOV.UK) · Primary source · 2020-10-19 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games · UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (GOV.UK) · Primary source · 2020-10-19 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games · UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (GOV.UK) · Primary source · 2020-10-19 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- [14]
The US agencies said Volt Typhoon had compromised critical infrastructure organizations mainly in communications, energy, transport and water, including in Guam, and that its targeting was not consistent with traditional espionage. confirmedas of 2024-02-07
- PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A) · Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency · Primary source · 2024-02-07 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A) · Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency · Primary source · 2024-02-07 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
- PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A) · Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency · Primary source · 2024-02-07 (retrieved 2026-11-14)
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Created Nov 14, 2026. Last reviewed by an editor on Nov 14, 2026. Next scheduled review: May 14, 2027.
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"State cyber operations explained: military cyber, law and attribution." ContentLora, updated Nov 14, 2026. https://contentlora.com/explain/state-cyber-operations-explained
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